Patricia Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-22-2020 
Patricia Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Patricia Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 918. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/918 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 




UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






PATRICIA THOMPSON,  
     
v. 
 
REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE NETWORK, INC.; SECURITY ATLANTIC 
MORTGAGE COMPANY, INC.; NOEL CHAPMAN, an Individual and; SAMUEL 
LAMPARELLO, an Individual, 
                  Appellants 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of New Jersey  
 (D.C. No. 2:11-cv-01494) 
District Judge: Honorable Kevin McNulty 
____________________________________ 
 
Argued: May 18, 2020 
 
Before:  McKEE, BIBAS, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 22, 2020) 
___________ 
 
Ari Karen, Esq. 
4800 Montgomery Lane, 8th Floor 
Bethesda, MD 20814 
 
Katharine Thomas Batista, Esq.   [ARGUED] 
Offit Kurman 
1801 Market Street 
Ten Penn Center 
Suite 2300 
 2 
Philadelphia, PA 19103 
Counsel for Appellants 
 
Mitchell A. Schley, Esq.    [ARGUED]  
Suite 3000 
197 Route 18 
East Brunswick, NJ 08816 
 
Judith L. Spanier, Esq. 
Abbey Spanier 
212 East 39th Street 
New York, NY 10016 





McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
The defendant-appellants, Real Estate Mortgage Network, et al. (“REMN”), 
appeal the district court’s denial of their Motion to Compel Arbitration.  They argue the 
district court erred in holding that REMN waived its right to arbitrate.  For the reasons set 
forth below, we hold that REMN is judicially estopped from relying on the arbitration 
agreement at issue here.  We will therefore affirm the order of the district court. 
 Judicial estoppel is a discretionary doctrine that “prevents a party from prevailing 
in one phase of the case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to 
prevail in another phase” of the case.1  It does not prevent the assertion of all inconsistent 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 
U.S. 211, 227 n. 8 (2000)).  
 3 
positions but “is designed to prevent litigants from playing fast and loose with the 
courts.”2  In deciding whether a position is unacceptably inconsistent, we start with “[t]he 
basic principle [that]…a party should not be allowed to gain an advantage by litigation on 
one theory, and then seek an inconsistent advantage by pursuing and incompatible 
theory.”3  We also consider “whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position 
would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if 
not estopped.”4  Both inconsistent legal theories and detriment to the opposing party are 
present here.  
REMN did not raise the issue of arbitration until September 2014, three and a half 
years after the complaint was filed.  It waited that long despite knowing the collective 
nature of the suit and that potential plaintiffs may be covered by arbitration agreements.5  
REMN’s failure to disclose this possible defense suggested that the arbitration 
agreements were not applicable or that they would not be asserted as a defense.  
Ultimately, REMN did not file the motion to compel arbitration until 2018, seven years 
into this litigation.   
 
2 Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(internal citation omitted). 
3 Id. (citing 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 4477 (1981)). 
4 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. at 751; see also Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 477 
n. 9 (3d Cir. 2006). 
5 Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network, Inc., No. 11-1494, 2019 WL 2636307 (D. 
N.J. June 26, 2019), at *8 (“This action is and always was conceived of as a collective 
action.”); see also id. at *2, *9. 
 4 
The delay is significant.  In addition, REMN claimed that potential putative class 
members would be able to pursue their claims in court in its motion opposing tolling the 
FLSA statute of limitations.  REMN argued in the brief it filed with the court: “[t]he 
filing of motions to dismiss do not preclude any potential member of the putative class 
from opting into this lawsuit prior to a decision on class certification or from initiating 
their own lawsuit alleging claims under the FLSA.”6  REMN made that assertion despite 
the existence of the arbitration clause in the post-restructuring agreements. 
REMN now argues the motion to compel arbitration was timely because they 
could not have filed it before late 2017.7  REMN had the opportunity to disclose the 
arbitration agreements both in their motion to dismiss the amended complaint—filed in 
2012 after restructuring their employee agreements—and in the mediation sessions that 
followed shortly after.8  Moreover, we are left with the clear conflict with the assertions 
REMN made in opposing Thompson’s motion to toll the FLSA statute of limitations.  
 
6 Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Toll the Running of the FLSA Statute 
of Limitations Period, at 5–6, Thompson v. Real Estate Mortgage Network, Inc., No. 11-
1494, 2019 WL 2636307 (D. N.J. Sept. 4, 2012).  
7 Appellants’ Br. 6. 
8 Thompson, 2019 WL 2636307, at *8 (“[T]he arbitration agreements existed and [the 
defendants knew] that they would be asserting them in opposition to class certification.”) 
See also id. at *9 (“I agree…that an actual motion to compel arbitration was not yet ripe 
at that point.…I also agree…that Defendants behaved opportunistically.”). 
 5 
REMN’s failure to rely upon the arbitration clause has cost Thompson extensive 
“time, effort, and money.”9  It has also prevented Thompson from making an informed 
response to REMN’s settlement offers; two of which were rejected.10 
 Inasmuch as REMN’s litigation history here exemplifies playing “fast and loose 
with the court[],”11 we will affirm the district court’s refusal to compel arbitration.  
 
9 Id. at *9 (The issues before the court could have “been mooted or transformed by the 
timely disclosure.”) (internal citation omitted). 
10 Appellee’s Br. 20. 
11 Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 
1996) (internal citation omitted).  
